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If not for the American Military role, and the entry of the US into WWII Dec 7 1941 we might all be speaking German today. Still it is important we IDENTIFY the ROTHSCHILDS and BANKSTERS who fund both sides of all WARS if we ever wish to live in peace.

The “Surprise” Pearl Harbor Attack
On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox (whose endorsement is included in the attached scans). Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt's most trusted military advisors. 
The memo detailed an 8-step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a complete surprise, an "intelligence failure", and America entered World War Two. 
“Intelligence failure”? Hardly. 

Dan van derDat, a British military historian, wrote in The Guardian last week that Capt. Eric Nave made "enormous inroads" into Japanese coded messages. In June 1939, shortly before World War II broke out in Europe, the Japanese Navy began using an important new code. Captain Nave was able to read all coded Japanese military communications by the end of the year.

So, contrary to the imposed myth of Pearl Harbor, we know that in fact the US not only maneuvered the Japanese into a situation where an attack on the US was Japan’s only option, the US and its allies had decoded and were reading secret Japanese Naval communiqués as early as 1939, TWO YEARS before the "surprise" attack on Pearl Harbor.

This newly released information, along with other compelling circumstantial evidence, proves that the government of the United States not only desired to lure Japan into an attack, it knew exactly when and where that attack would occur. 

This information was finally declassified in 1994. It took fifty years for the truth about Pearl Harbor to be revealed. Will we have to wait that long for the truth of 9/11 to come out?
[Research: courtesy of Michael Rivero, WRH] 

The Memo 

 0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
 Memorandum for the Director
 Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and
 Recommendations for Action by the United States.
 1. The United States today finds herself confronted
 by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally
 hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between
 these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but
 in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers,
 and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected
 to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their
 prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been
 successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe
 is either under their military control or has been forced into
 subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by
 war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their
 2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof
 from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence
 to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every
 method within their power to foster a continuation of American
 indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically,
 every success of German and Italian arms has led to further
 increases in United States sympathy for and material support of
 the British Empire, until at the present time the United States
 government stands committed to a policy of rendering every
 support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that
 the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British
 Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German
 and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of
 a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of
 developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world,
 notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America
 by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further
 aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these
 mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought
 and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to
 become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to
 virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a
 result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded
 a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States
 If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed
 utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed,
 and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three
 totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States,
 should she come to the assistance of England, or should she
 attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and,
 furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to
 determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a
 cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating
 England. In other words, after England has been disposed of
 her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed
 with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions,
 neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any
 material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much
 help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even
 attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia,
 India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening
 Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe.
 In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize
 all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the
 added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power
 to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United
 States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan.
 Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese
 diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized,
 and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to
 preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either
 sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that
 the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe
 or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the
 United States in either theatre of operations.
 3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads
 to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now,
 immediately to help Britain that is not already being done.
 We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England,
 nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to
 increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the
 defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will
 undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little
 that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England
 continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the
 Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible
 early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling
 intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of
 such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we
 actually allied in war with the British or at the very least
 were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain
 in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security
 in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet
 remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.
 4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance
 with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security
 of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the
 power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the
 United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy
 through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal
 with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very
 serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted
 or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez
 Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis
 powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual
 elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus
 opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for
 Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be
 diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe
 and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.
 5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is
 little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve
 the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively
 nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening
 U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.
 6. An examination of Japan's present position as
 opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:
 Advantages Disadvantages
 1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men
 of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war
 on the Asiatic Continent.
 2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food
 capable government. supply severely straightened.
 3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of
 a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably
 oil, iron and cotton.
 4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies
 and war. from Europe.
 5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas
 routes for essential supplies.
 6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing
 the strength of the U.S. Navy. manufacture and supply of war
 materials without free access
 to U.S. or European markets.
 7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial
 centers extremely vulnerable
 to air attack.
 8. Weather until April rendering
 direct sea operations in the
 vicinity of Japan difficult.
 7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong
 defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present
 in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There
 are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly
 in our favor, viz:
 A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
 B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control
 of the Dutch East Indies.
 C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and
 are favorable to us.
 D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field
 in China against Japan.
 E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously
 threatening Japan's southern supply routes
 already in the theatre of operations.
 F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the
 Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.
 8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the
 conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by
 the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any
 help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that
 Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy
 could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept
 fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
 A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable
 arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective
 in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating
 our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike
 at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely
 strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in
 addition, such action would increase the confidence and support
 of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.
 9. It is not believed that in the present state of
 political opinion the United States government is capable of
 declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely
 possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the
 Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following
 course of action is suggested:
 A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of
 British bases in the Pacific, particularly
 B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of
 base facilities and acquisition of supplies
 in the Dutch East Indies.
 C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government
 of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
 D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to
 the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
 E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
 F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in
 the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
 G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese
 demands for undue economic concessions,
 particularly oil.
 H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan,
 in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed
 by the British Empire.
 10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an
 overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully
 prepared to accept the threat of war.
 A. H. McCollum
 0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
 1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of
 powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
 2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile
 action against the United States in this area.
 3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea
 communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an
 attack on the British lines of communication in the
 Indian Ocean.
 4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is
 to remain effective.
 5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are
 capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify
 her assistance to Germany and Italy.
 6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate
 Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity
 by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.
 7. In the absence of United States ability to take the
 political offensive, additional naval force should be
 sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland
 and England that would serve as an effective check against
 Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.
 Comment by Captain Knox
 It is unquestionably to out general interest
 that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate
 and probably cant do better. We ought to make it certain
 that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably
 need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements
 to England. We should not precipitate anything in the
 Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as
 probability continues.
 If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious
 in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic
 is also protection to her and us in the Orient.
 However, I concur in your courses of action
 we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough
 to care for both.
 Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not
 visiting west coast in bunches.
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