Plant Trees SF Events 2012 Archive: 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019


From: Tony Gosling US Intelligence Facilities in an Information Void on 9/11

In my new blog entry, copied below, I describe how critical U.S.
intelligence facilities were in an information blackout during the
9/11 attacks, which meant they had to rely on TV reports to find out
what was going on. I suggest that this blackout was caused
deliberately by the perpetrators of the attacks, to help ensure that
the attacks succeeded.

The original posting, with links to sources, is on my blog, here:

Why Were U.S. Intelligence Facilities in an 'Information Void' During
the 9/11 Attacks?

When the terrorist attacks began on September 11, 2001, numerous U.S.
intelligence agencies and facilities that should have been closely
following the catastrophic events taking place in the skies over
America were unaware that anything was wrong. Because of their
particular responsibilities and their advanced capabilities, agencies
such as the FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) should have
been among the first to learn the details of the crisis. But,
instead, they were apparently in an information blackout, and their
knowledge of the attacks was limited to what they could learn from
television reports.

The fact that key intelligence agencies and facilities experienced
this problem, and all at the same time, suggests that the information
blackout may have been intentional--an act of sabotage committed by
the perpetrators of the attacks. Such an act could have been intended
to render these agencies and facilities useless when their services
were urgently needed, thereby helping to ensure that the attacks were

The lack of awareness of the crisis on September 11 is highlighted in
the accounts of two military officers who contacted numerous
facilities in their attempts to learn more about the attacks. These
officers were Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stuart, an intelligence officer
at NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), and Major David
McNulty, the senior intelligence officer of the 113th Wing of the
District of Columbia Air National Guard at Andrews Air Force Base. [1]

Stuart and McNulty's units had crucial roles to play on September 11.
NEADS, based in Rome, New York, was responsible for coordinating the
U.S. military's response to the hijackings. [2] And "air defense
around Washington, DC," according to Knight Ridder, was provided
"mainly by fighter planes from Andrews Air Force Base," which is just
10 miles from the capital. [3] The DC Air National Guard was in fact
known as the "Capital Guardians." [4] It was therefore essential that
Stuart and McNulty be provided with up-to-the-minute information on
the attacks. That, however, did not happen.

NEADS was alerted to the first hijacking--that of American Airlines
Flight 11--just before 8:38 a.m. on September 11, when an air traffic
controller called to report the incident and request military
assistance. [5] Beginning at around 8:48 a.m., Mark Stuart contacted
several facilities to see if they had any information on the
hijacking, beyond what he had already learned. These facilities
included the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center, the
National Military Joint Intelligence Center, and the 1st Air Force
headquarters. None of them could provide any additional information.
A colleague of Stuart's checked the SIPRNET--the U.S. military
Internet system--for relevant information, but also without success. [6]

At Andrews Air Force Base, about five minutes or so after he learned
that a second plane had hit the World Trade Center (the crash
occurred at 9:03 a.m.), McNulty went to his "intel vault" and began
seeking relevant information. He too checked the SIPRNET. He called
agencies such as the FBI, the CIA, and the NSA. He also called units
such as the Air Combat Command Intelligence Squadron and the 609th
Air Intelligence Squadron. But he was unable to find out anything
more than he had already learned from television reports. [7]

Other accounts provide further details of the lack of awareness of
the catastrophic events within the military and other government
agencies. Indeed, the information blackout appears to have been
almost universal. One government official commented that the U.S. was
"deaf, dumb, and blind" for much of September 11. [8]

Although many key facilities were unaware of what was happening at
the time the WTC towers were hit, indications of the crisis had been
evident much earlier on. These indications were received or noticed
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is responsible
for operating the U.S. air traffic control system, or by American Airlines.

The first sign that something was wrong came nearly 33 minutes before
Flight 11 crashed into the WTC, when communication with the plane was
lost. Just before 8:14 a.m., the plane's crew failed to respond to an
instruction to climb to 35,000 feet. The air traffic controller at
the FAA's Boston Center who was handling Flight 11 tried repeatedly
to contact the plane over the next 10 minutes, but without success. [9]

Boston Center controllers noticed a further indication of the
emergency at 8:21 a.m., when Flight 11's transponder--the equipment
that transmits identifying information about a plane to radar
screens--was turned off. This, according to the Christian Science
Monitor, was "something more worrisome" than the loss of radio contact. [10]

Then, at around 8:25 a.m., the controller handling Flight 11 heard a
couple of suspicious radio transmissions, apparently made by a
hijacker on Flight 11, which led him to conclude that the plane had
been hijacked. At that point, the Boston Center began notifying its
chain of command within the FAA of the suspected hijacking. [11]

A minute later, at 8:26 a.m., Boston Center controllers noticed
Flight 11 drastically changing course, turning sharply to the south.
[12] This was a significant development. Darrel Smith, an
intelligence officer working at FAA headquarters that morning, has
commented that he was particularly alarmed when he learned about it,
because such a deviation was like "changing directions off I-95 north
and heading south." Flight 11's change of course "jeopardized the
other flights in the surrounding airspace," he said. [13]

American Airlines, like the FAA, was aware of the crisis well before
the first plane hit the WTC. At 8:19 a.m., Betty Ong, one of the
flight attendants on Flight 11, contacted the American Airlines
Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, and, in a
25-minute phone call, relayed crucial information about what was
happening on her plane. A couple of minutes after Ong's call began, a
supervisor at the reservations office called the American Airlines
System Operations Control Center in Fort Worth, Texas, and alerted it
to the information that Ong was providing. And at 8:32 a.m., Amy
Sweeney, another of the plane's flight attendants, reached the
American Airlines flight services office in Boston. In a 12-minute
phone call, she provided details of the crisis to the manager there.

In their calls, Ong and Sweeney made clear the seriousness of the
situation. They reported that Flight 11 had been hijacked and that
the hijackers were in the cockpit; two flight attendants had been
stabbed; one passenger had his throat slashed and died as a result;
and there was a bomb in the cockpit. [14]

But while American Airlines and the FAA knew details of the emergency
early on, other agencies and facilities that should also have been
closely following the crisis were unaware that anything was wrong. So
when Mark Stuart, at NEADS, contacted a number of intelligence
facilities, beginning shortly after the first plane hit the WTC, he
found they had no information beyond what he already knew. [15] And
David McNulty, at Andrews Air Force Base, has recalled that when he
did the same, beginning several minutes after the second plane hit
the WTC, he felt like he was "waking up the national agencies" and
found that the agencies he called "had nothing to report." [16]

Mark Stuart called the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations
Center (SIOC) to report the hijacking of Flight 11. Stuart told the
9/11 Commission that he made the call at around 8:48 a.m. This was
two minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World
Trade Center. [17]

The SIOC should have been well suited to handling the 9/11 attacks.
The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept
of Operations Plan of January 2001 stated that the SIOC's role was
"to coordinate and manage the national level support to a terrorism
incident." [18] The purpose of the center, according to FBI
officials, was "to keep the FBI updated on any crisis through
sophisticated computers and communications equipment."

The SIOC, which opened in 1998, was a 40,000-square-foot facility on
the fifth floor of the FBI's headquarters in Washington. It was
designed to handle up to five crises at the same time, and, during a
major emergency, could accommodate up to 450 people. [19]

The SIOC functioned as a 24-hour watch post and crisis management
center. [20] It had 10-member watch teams on duty at all times. These
teams included a representative from the NSA's Cryptologic Security
Group, who could provide information from the government's worldwide
electronic eavesdropping. [21] The center's 225 computer terminals
had access to three types of local area networks: the regular FBI
network that could connect to the networks of outside agencies; a
classified network that operated at the level of Top Secret; and an
even more highly classified Special Compartmented Information network. [22]

FBI agents and top officials, along with representatives from many
other government agencies, went to the SIOC on September 11 in
response to the terrorist attacks. [23] John Ashcroft, the attorney
general at the time, told the 9/11 Commission that "the SIOC was the
place to be to get information and so everyone wanted to be there." [24]

And yet, despite the center's key responsibilities and its advanced
capabilities, personnel in this state-of-the-art command post were
apparently no better informed about the 9/11 attacks than members of
the public watching the events on television. Stuart has recalled
that when he called the SIOC, the center "had no information to pass
that could shed light on the nature of the American Air 11
hijacking." Stuart was handed off to two or three individuals at the
center. He explained to them what was happening and asked for law
enforcement information. But, Stuart has said, "They had nothing."
One of the people that Stuart spoke to said to him, "Oh *, I have to
go," and then hung up. [25]

Fred Stremmel, an FBI counterterrorism analyst, was in the SIOC when
the attacks began and has described events there. According to his
account, those in the center only realized the U.S. was under
terrorist attack when they saw the second plane hitting the WTC on television.

Stremmel learned of the crisis that morning when a colleague in the
SIOC told him about the first plane hitting the WTC. A crowd was
watching the television coverage of the crash on a giant video
screen, and Stremmel saw the second plane hitting the WTC when it was
broadcast live, at 9:03 a.m. According to journalist and author
Garrett Graff, at that time, "Everyone in the operations center stood
there stunned." Stremmel has commented that after seeing the second
crash on TV, those in the SIOC "probably knew it was terrorism, but
we were in denial. It's like being told you have cancer. You want to
deny it for as long as possible." [26]

Even the FBI's top officials were apparently no more aware of what
was happening than members of the public were. FBI Director Robert
Mueller was holding his daily briefing in his conference room at the
FBI headquarters when the attacks began. All of the bureau's
assistant directors were with him, including Dale Watson, the head of
counterterrorism. They all learned of the crisis when someone
interrupted the briefing and told them a plane had crashed into the
WTC. However, they were initially unclear about whether this was a
terrorist attack. "How could a plane not see the tower? It's so clear
out today," Mueller reportedly said. Some of the group then went to
the office of Deputy Director Thomas Pickard. There they saw the
second crash live on television and realized for certain that this
was terrorism. Only then did Watson go to his office and activate the
SIOC for crisis mode, and Pickard and Mueller quickly made their way
to the SIOC. [27]

Agents at the FBI's Washington, DC, field office were just as poorly
informed. The Washington field office was one of the facilities David
McNulty called after the second hijacked plane, United Airlines
Flight 175, hit the South Tower of the WTC. However, it could provide
him with no additional information on the crisis. "It was a fruitless
effort," McNulty has commented. [28]

After calling the SIOC, Mark Stuart called the National Military
Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) about the hijacking of Flight 11.
[29] The NMJIC, which is located in the Joint Staff area of the
Pentagon, constantly monitors worldwide developments for any looming
crisis that might require U.S. involvement. [30] Agencies such as the
CIA and the NSA have full-time representatives there. According to
James Clapper, a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
"During actual crises, NMJIC serves as a clearinghouse for all
requests for national-level intelligence information." [31]

The NMJIC should presumably, therefore, have been aware of the crisis
on September 11 from the outset. But when Stuart called the Air Force
desk there, he found that the NMJIC "had no additional relevant
information" it could provide him with. [32] Furthermore, personnel
in the NMJIC appear to have remained poorly informed about the
unfolding emergency after Stuart contacted them, and they were even
unaware that their building had been hit when it was attacked at 9:37 a.m.

Marc Garlasco, a senior intelligence analyst at the Pentagon, was in
the NMJIC on September 11. Garlasco has recalled that he was in a
meeting that morning and only learned of the crisis when a colleague
said to him, "Oh, you know, [the World Trade Center has] been hit."
He then started watching the television coverage of the crash and
therefore saw Flight 175 hitting the South Tower at 9:03 a.m.

However, when the Pentagon was attacked over 30 minutes later,
Garlasco was unaware that his building had been hit. The NMJIC is on
the opposite side of the Pentagon to where the impact occurred, so
Garlasco did not feel or hear the explosion from the attack. More
significantly, considering that the NMJIC presumably had advanced
capabilities and also had a key role to play during an event like
9/11, those in the center apparently were not immediately informed of
the attack on the Pentagon by any other means. Garlasco has recalled
that he "was really still surprised when the boys in black pajamas
ran into the office with their submachine guns and screamed,
'Evacuate, we've just been hit.'" (Presumably "the boys in black
pajamas" were members of the Defense Protective Service--the law
enforcement agency that guards the Pentagon.) [33]

Another agency we might reasonably expect to have been following the
9/11 attacks from the outset is the National Security Agency. This is
one of the facilities that David McNulty contacted in his search for
information. [34]

The NSA, at Fort Meade, Maryland, is responsible for collecting and
analyzing foreign communications, and protecting U.S. government
communications and information systems. Author James Bamford, an
expert on the agency, called it "the largest, most secret, and most
advanced spy organization on the planet." In 2001, it had around
38,000 employees, which was more than the CIA and FBI combined. [35]

And yet McNulty has recalled that when he phoned the NSA's "24-hour
information desk" at some time after the second plane hit the WTC,
"they knew nothing more than I did." McNulty has commented, "We were
all getting our information from CNN." [36]

Even Michael Hayden, the director of the NSA at the time, was unaware
of the crisis when the WTC towers were hit. Hayden was in his office,
holding a routine meeting with a few senior agency officials, when he
received his first notification of what was happening. His executive
assistant came in and told him a plane had hit the World Trade
Center. [37] Hayden thought the crash was probably a "horrible
accident." [38] "The immediate image I had was a light plane, off
course, bad flying," he has said.

Hayden walked over to his desk, on which a television was showing the
coverage of the burning WTC. Hayden "thought that was a big fire for
a small plane," he has recalled. All the same, he continued with his
meeting. [39] Hayden only realized the U.S. was under terrorist
attack when his executive assistant came in again, shortly after 9:00
a.m., and told him about the second plane hitting the WTC. At that
point, he has recalled, "it removed all doubt from me ... that this
had to be an attack." [40]

The NSA's lack of awareness is particularly notable because the
agency has a facility that is meant to detect when an attack is about
to take place. The Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center
(DEFSMAC), located in the NSA's main operations building, is intended
to serve as "the nation's chief warning bell for a planned attack on
America," according to Bamford.

DEFSMAC "serves as the focal point for 'all-source'
intelligence--listening posts, early-warning satellites, human
agents, and seismic detectors," and its analysts spend their time
"closely monitoring all intercepts flooding in; examining the latest
overhead photography; and analyzing data from early-warning
satellites 22,300 miles above the equator." The center will then
"flash the intelligence to the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air
Force Base in Nebraska, NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, and
other emergency command centers."

A former NSA official explained that DEFSMAC "has all the inputs from
all the assets and is a warning activity. They probably have a better
feel for any worldwide threat to this country from missiles,
aircraft, or overt military activities, better and more timely, at
instant fingertip availability, than any group in the United States."

And yet DEFSMAC failed to pick up the signs of the 9/11 attacks.
Bamford noted, "On the morning of September 11, DEFSMAC learned of
the massive airborne attacks after the fact--not from America's
multibillion-dollar spy satellites or its worldwide network of
advanced listening posts, or its army of human spies, but from a
dusty, off-the-shelf TV set."

DEFSMAC's failure would have had serious consequences. According to
Bamford, "Upon receiving indicators that an attack was imminent,
DEFSMAC officials would immediately send out near-real-time and
in-depth, all-source intelligence alerts to almost 200 'customers,'
including the White House Situation Room, the National Military
Command Center at the Pentagon, the DIA Alert Center, and listening
posts around the world." [41] But because DEFSMAC failed to pick up
signs of the 9/11 attacks, these "customers" would have lacked the
early warning the center should have provided.

While they were seeking information on the terrorist attacks, an
intelligence officer at NEADS and David McNulty at Andrews Air Force
Base checked the "SIPRNET." [42] This is the U.S. Department of
Defense's version of the Internet, which can handle classified
information, up to the secret level. [43]

The SIPRNET should have been a valuable tool for keeping military
personnel updated with the latest information on the attacks. Colonel
Brian Meenan, the director of the military cell at the FAA's Command
Center in Herndon, Virginia, explained the benefits of his unit
having a SIPRNET terminal installed shortly before 9/11. He said that
having the terminal meant "we could immediately look at NORAD and
[Defense Department] plans as they evolved; filter, package, and
format them, then walk out to the [FAA] national operations
manager--who had control of the entire national airspace system--and
give him current visibility into ... fighter, tanker, and support
aircraft activities." [44]

And yet McNulty was unable to find out anything more from the SIPRNET
than what he had learned from television. [45] At NEADS, Mark Stuart
instructed a colleague to search the SIPRNET for information relating
to the attacks. But Stuart has recalled that his colleague "found
none that morning or afternoon." [46]

Stuart and McNulty contacted several military units as they sought
information about the attacks, but without success. McNulty called
the Air Combat Command Intelligence Squadron at Langley Air Force
Base, Virginia, and the 609th Air Intelligence Squadron at Shaw Air
Force Base, South Carolina, but both were unable to provide him with
any new information. [47] And Stuart, after contacting the NMJIC,
called an intelligence officer with the 1st Air Force at Tyndall Air
Force Base, Florida. But, Stuart has recalled, the 1st Air Force had
"no further information" on the attacks. [48]

Other accounts reveal that personnel in the NORAD operations center
in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado--another key facility--were similarly
unaware of what was happening. The Cheyenne Mountain Operations
Center (CMOC), according to NORAD, collected data "from a worldwide
system of satellites, radars, and other sensors, and processes that
information on sophisticated computer systems to support critical
NORAD and U.S. Space Command missions." [49] The Toronto Star
reported that the center's role was "to fuse every critical piece of
information NORAD has into a concise and crystalline snapshot." [50]
Airman described CMOC personnel as "the eyes and ears of North
America," and stated that "nothing escapes their unsleeping watch." [51]

And since NORAD is the military organization responsible for
monitoring and defending U.S. airspace, we might reasonably expect
personnel in its operations center to have been very much aware of
the crisis taking place in the skies over America on September 11.
But, as officers who were on duty in the CMOC that day have made
clear, this was not the case.

Lieutenant Colonel William Glover said that the morning of September
11 was his "first time ... thinking about the fog of war, because we
didn't know what was going on." [52] Lieutenant Colonel Steven
Armstrong recalled that those in the CMOC "were out there in an
information void, just looking for anything that we could find." [53]
Armstrong said, "The majority of the information we're getting at the
time is literally off the TV." [54] And Major General Rick Findley
commented, "We were a little bit behind the power curve most of that
morning as we were trying to figure out exactly what transpired." [55]

The evidence described above raises many questions that require
serious investigation. Other facilities, besides those discussed
here, were presumably in the same "information void" during the 9/11
attacks. Investigators and researchers should determine if this was
the case. If it was, which facilities were affected, and what
problems did they experience?

We also need to know when key facilities and agencies, such as those
contacted by Mark Stuart and David McNulty, finally gained a greater
awareness of the crisis and became able to make use of their own
capabilities, rather than having to rely on television reports as
their main source of information. And we need to determine what
caused the information blackout. Have previous investigations looked
into this? If so, what did they find?

If, as previously suggested, the lack of awareness within the U.S.
government and military of the catastrophic events on September 11
was due to sabotage, this would have serious implications. The 19
young Arabs accused of hijacking four planes and carrying out the
attacks would surely have lacked the capability to cause an
information blackout across numerous intelligence facilities. Highly
skilled individuals with knowledge and experience of how the military
and intelligence agencies operate must presumably have been involved.
If this was the case, it would mean that men who had worked for the
U.S. military or U.S. intelligence agencies likely helped plan and
carry out the 9/11 attacks.

[1] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E.
Stuart, USAF, Intelligence Officer, Northeast Air Defense Sector
(NEADS)." 9/11 Commission, October 30, 2003; "Memorandum for the
Record: Interview With Major David McNulty, Chief of Intelligence,
121st Fighter Squadron, Air National Guard, Andrews Air Force Base."
9/11 Commission, March 11, 2004.
[2] Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." Vanity Fair,
August 2006; Philip Shenon, The Commission: The Uncensored History of
the 9/11 Investigation. New York: Twelve, 2008, p. 203.
[3] Steve Goldstein, "Focus of Training for Terrorist Attacks Has
Been Chemical, Biological Warfare." Knight Ridder, September 11,
2001; "Andrews AFB, Maryland.", May 7, 2011.
[4] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama
That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free
Press, 2008, p. 122; Andrew Wackerfuss, "'We Did What Guardsmen
Always Do': The Air National Guard Responds on 9/11." New Patriot,
July/August 2011.
[5] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 20.
[6] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[7] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air
Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, p.
79; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major David McNulty";
Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 155-156.
[8] Dan Verton, Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terrorism.
Emeryville, CA: McGraw-Hill/Osborne, 2003, p. 151.
[9] "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001."
Federal Aviation Administration, September 17, 2001; "Transcript
American Airlines Flight 11." New York Times, October 16, 2001;
"Flight Path Study: American Airlines Flight 11." National
Transportation Safety Board, February 19, 2002.
[10] Mark Clayton, "Controllers' Tale of Flight 11." Christian
Science Monitor, September 13, 2001; Staff Report: The Four Flights.
9/11 Commission, August 26, 2004, p. 9.
[11] "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events"; 9/11 Commission, The
9/11 Commission Report, p. 19.
[12] "Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events"; "Flight Path Study:
American Airlines Flight 11"; "The Skies Over America: The Air
Traffic Controllers on 9/11 Saw the Nightmare Coming." Dateline, NBC,
September 9, 2006.
[13] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Darrel Smith." 9/11
Commission, July 13, 2004.
[14] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 5-6; Staff
Report: The Four Flights, pp. 8-12.
[15] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[16] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major David McNulty."
[17] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[18] United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept
of Operations Plan. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management
Agency, January 2001, p. 20.
[19] "FBI Opens High-Tech Crisis Center." CNN, November 20, 1998.
[20] "Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) Fact Sheet."
Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 18, 2004.
[21] "FBI Opens High-Tech Crisis Center."
[22] Jim McGee, "In Federal Law Enforcement, 'All the Walls Are
Down.'" Washington Post, October 14, 2001; "Strategic Information and
Operations Center (SIOC) Fact Sheet."
[23] Ronald Kessler, The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2002, p. 5.
[24] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Attorney General John
D. Ashcroft." 9/11 Commission, December 17, 2003.
[25] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[26] Jim McGee, "In Federal Law Enforcement, 'All the Walls Are
Down'"; Garrett M. Graff, The Threat Matrix: The FBI at War in the
Age of Global Terror. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011, p. 317.
[27] "September 11, 2001." New Yorker, September 24, 2001; Ronald
Kessler, The Bureau, pp. 419-420; Garrett M. Graff, The Threat
Matrix, pp. 314-315.
[28] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major David McNulty";
Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 155-156.
[29] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[30] Ernest Blazar, "Inside the Ring." Washington Times, September
25, 1997; "National Military Joint Intelligence Alert Center." Joint
Chiefs of Staff, February 6, 2006.
[31] James R. Clapper Jr., "Challenging Joint Military Intelligence."
Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994.
[32] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[33] "The Pentagon on Sept. 11: One Survivor's Account." Fresh Air,
NPR, May 22, 2008.
[34] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, p. 79.
[35] James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret
National Security Agency. New York: Doubleday, 2001, pp. 4, 482;
George Cahlink, "Breaking the Code." Government Executive, September 1, 2001.
[36] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, p. 79; "Memorandum for the
Record: Interview With Major David McNulty."
[37] James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of
America's Intelligence Agencies. New York: Doubleday, 2004, pp. 18,
20; Sara Sorcher, "Former, Current Officials Reflect on Bin Laden
Hunt a Decade After 9/11: Video." National Journal, September 8, 2011.
[38] Ariel Sabar, "General Goes a Little Public to Enhance Image of
NSA." Baltimore Sun, April 19, 2002; "9/11 10 Years After: Interview
With Andy Card; Interview With Michael Hayden." Live Event/Special,
CNN, September 11, 2011.
[39] James Bamford, A Pretext for War, pp. 18, 20.
[40] Ibid., p. 33; "9/11 10 Years After: Interview With Andy Card;
Interview With Michael Hayden."
[41] James Bamford, A Pretext for War, pp. 33-35.
[42] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E.
Stuart"; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major David McNulty."
[43] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 155; Sharon Weinberger, "What
is SIPRNET?" Popular Mechanics, December 1, 2010.
[44] William B. Scott, "Command Cells Speed Airspace Reactivation."
Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 10, 2002.
[45] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Major David McNulty";
Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 155-156.
[46] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[47] Lynn Spencer, Touching History, pp. 155-156.
[48] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Lt. Col. Mark E. Stuart."
[49] "Cheyenne Mountain." North American Aerospace Defense Command,
November 27, 1999.
[50] Scott Simmie, "The Scene at NORAD on Sept. 11: Playing Russian
War Games ... and Then Someone Shouted to Look at the Monitor."
Toronto Star, December 9, 2001.
[51] Pat McKenna, "The Border Guards." Airman, January 1996.
[52] "NORAD." The Early Edition, CBC, September 8, 2011.
[53] "In Their Own Words--NORAD Members Recall September 11, Part 3:
Steve Armstrong." North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 9, 2011.
[54] Kevin Simpson, "Rearmed Forces: 9/11 Changed Military Life in
Colorado." Denver Post, August 28, 2011.
[55] Steve Mertl, "Canadian General Who Led NORAD on 9/11 Praises its
Performance, Considering." Canadian Press, September 10, 2006.
+44 (0)7786 952037
"Capitalism is institutionalised bribery."

"The maintenance of secrets acts like a psychic poison which
alienates the possessor from the community" Carl Jung

Fear not therefore: for there is nothing covered that shall not be
revealed; and nothing hid that shall not be made known. What I tell
you in darkness, that speak ye in the light and what ye hear in the
ear, that preach ye upon the housetops. Matthew 10:26-27

Die Pride and Envie; Flesh, take the poor's advice.
Covetousnesse be gon: Come, Truth and Love arise.
Patience take the Crown; throw Anger out of dores:
Cast out Hypocrisie and Lust, which follows whores:
Then England sit in rest; Thy sorrows will have end;
Thy Sons will live in peace, and each will be a friend.
For updates and info, contact scott at planttrees dot org.